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 Within the Gricean framework only what is conversationally implicated is cancellable, whereas what is convention-
ally implicated and what is said cannot be cancelled without giving rise to contradiction. In the relevance-theoretic 
framework, however, the question is whether explicatures, which replace the Gricean notion of what is said, are 
cancellable. In recent years, various objections to the cancellability of explicatures have been raised. The aim of the 
present paper is to demonstrate that these objections are due to a misinterpretation of the Gricean cancellability 
test. In particular, they disregard the fact that this test is merely one of several diagnostic tools that are used by Grice 
to distinguish between conventional and conversational implicatures. Once we have recognized the essence of the 
cancellability test, the objections to the cancellability of explicatures turn out to be unwarranted.
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Background
Within his framework, Grice differentiates between cer-
tain kinds of implicatures such as conventional implica-
tures, generalized conversational implicatures and 
particularized conversational implicatures. However, 
keeping apart these different kinds of implicatures is not 
always that easy. In particular, the distinction between 
conventional and generalized conversational implicatures 
proves to be difficult in that generalized conversational 
implicatures “are relatively independent of context and 
therefore can rather easily be confused with conventional 
implicatures since they are constantly associated with 
particular linguistic forms” (Sadock 1978: 283). However, 
Grice maintains that there are certain tests which help to 
differentiate between conventional and conversational 
implicatures and which can be used for identifying con-
versational implicatures (see Huang 2014: 39–43). Proba-
bly the best known of these tests is the so-called 
cancellability test. As Blome-Tillmann points out, this 
test “has been brought to bear not only in linguistics and 
the philosophy of language but also in areas as diverse as 
ethics, epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of 
mind” (Blome-Tillmann 2008: 156).1 So let us take a look 
at what Grice tells us about the cancellability test:
You will remember that a putative conversational 
implicature that p is explicitly cancelable if, to the 
form of words the utterance of which putatively 
implicates that p, it is admissible to add but not p, 
or I do not mean to imply that p, and it is contex-
tually cancelable if one can find situations in which 
the utterance of the form of words would simply not 
carry the implicature. (Grice 1978: 115–116)
As we can see, Grice draws a distinction between two 
types of cancellability which are called explicit cancella-
bility and contextual cancellability. Explicit cancellability 
is given when one can cancel the implicature by amend-
ing a cancellation clause. However, the amendment of 
1 For the first time, Grice makes use of the cancellability test in his paper 
Meaning where he gives two examples that demonstrate the explicit cancel-
lability of non-natural meanings (see Grice 1957: 377–378). For the second 
time, the cancellability test is mentioned by Grice in The Causal Theory of 
Perception where he provides a short overview of his theory of conversation 
and relies on the cancellability test to distinguish between semantic presup-
positions, conventional implicatures and conversational implicatures (see 
Grice 1961: 128). For the third time, the cancellability test is mentioned in 
Logic and Coversation where Grice employs this test to distinguish between 
conventional and conversational implicatures (see Grice 1975: 57).
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this clause must be “admissible” (ibid.: 115) and may not 
result in “logical absurdity” (Grice 1981: 186) or “linguis-
tic offense” (ibid.). That is, the amendment of the can-
cellation clause may not give rise to the truth-theoretic 
relation of contradiction (see Cappelen 2000: 3). This is 
why cancellations of conventional implicatures are infe-
licitous, whereas cancellations of conversational implica-
tures are felicitous. Let us take a look at some examples 
of explicit cancellations:
(1) She was poor but she was honest. #And poor people 
are usually honest.
The attempt to cancel the conventional implicature in 
(1) gives rise to contradiction, since we first make use 
of a certain form of words and then try to take it out 
again instead of omitting it in the first place (see Hage-
mann 2011: 215). In contrast, cancellations of conversa-
tional implicatures do not give rise to contradiction. For 
instance, imagine a situation in which someone is out 
of petrol. Even if the speaker in (2) implicates that the 
garage round the corner is open and has petrol to sell, 
this implicature can be cancelled by the amendment of a 
cancellation clause:
(2) There is a garage round the corner. But it’s closed.
So far, we have been concerned with cancellability in 
terms of explicit cancellability. Contextual cancellabil-
ity, however, is a completely different matter. It is given 
when one can imagine an utterance context in which 
the utterance does not carry the implicature in question. 
Accordingly, contextual cancellations of conventional 
implicatures are infelicitous, whereas contextual cancel-
lations of conversational implicatures are felicitous. To 
illustrate, consider once again the examples aforemen-
tioned. Given that the conventional implicature in (1) 
depends on the conventional meaning of the linguistic 
expression but, the implicature will be the same in any 
utterance context. This is why it cannot be cancelled by 
means of contextual cancellation. In contrast, the con-
versational implicature in (2) is contextually cancellable. 
For instance, we may imagine an utterance context in 
which the hearer just wants to know where she can find 
a garage. In this case, saying that there is a garage round 
the corner would not carry the implicature that the 
hearer can buy some petrol there. All the speaker conveys 
by her utterance is that there is a garage round the corner.
It is important to note that the two types of cancellabil-
ity rely on two types of cancellation which are called 
explicit and contextual cancellation. In a sense, these two 
types of cancellation are rather different. While explicit 
cancellation pertains to a particular utterance context, 
contextual cancellation refers to a sentence uttered and 
the meanings that can be communicated with it in differ-
ent utterance contexts. Accordingly, Jaszczolt maintains 
that explicit cancellation is an empirically verifiable phe-
nomenon, whereas contextual cancellation is just a kind 
of thought experiment (see Jaszczolt 2009: 261). How-
ever, in what follows I argue that this view on the two 
types of cancellation is highly misleading and that both of 
them should be considered thought experiments: either 
we have to imagine a cancellation clause which cancels 
the implicature, or we have to imagine an utterance con-
text in which the utterance does not give rise to the 
implicature.2 This view on explicit and contextual cancel-
lation accounts for the fact that both are part of the 
Gricean cancellability test which is nothing else than one 
of several diagnostic tools used to distinguish between 
conventional and conversational implicatures.
However, there is dissent concerning the general con-
ception of the cancellability test. In particular, it is some-
times argued that this test has to be understood as a 
conjunction of explicit and contextual cancellation which 
is why any conversational implicature has to be explicitly 
as well as contextually cancellable; otherwise we are not 
dealing with a case of conversational implicature (see 
Blome-Tillmann 2008: 157; Weiner 2006: 128). The prob-
lem with this view is that Grice merely mentions that the 
cancellation of an implicature may take two different 
routes: it may be cancelled explicitly or it may be can-
celled contextually. Correspondingly, it is sufficient for a 
conversational implicature to be cancellable in at least 
one of the two ways aforementioned (see Jaszczolt 2009: 
263).3
There is one last point that should be made with regard 
to the cancellability test. Given that this test meets cer-
tain problems, Grice does not “regard the fulfillment of 
a cancelability test as decisively establishing the pres-
ence of a conversational implicature” (Grice 1978: 116). 
Rather, the test indicates that we are possibly dealing 
with a conversational implicature (see Geurts 2010: 20). 
A first problem mentioned by Grice pertains to cases in 
which the speaker uses a form of words loosely:
One way in which the test may fail is connected with 
the possibility of using a word or form of words in 
a loose or relaxed way. Suppose that two people are 
considering the purchase of a tie which both of them 
know to be medium green; they look at it in different 
lights, and say such things as It is a light green now, 
2 Accordingly, explicit cancellations are not performed by speakers, but by 
pragmaticians who carry out the cancellability test.
3 See Akerman (2015), Blome-Tillmann (2013), Borge (2009), Dahlman 
(2013) and Haugh (2013).
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or It has a touch of blue in it in this light. Strictly 
(perhaps) it would be correct for them to say It looks 
light green now or It seems to have a touch of blue 
in it in this light, but it would be unnecessary to put 
in such qualificatory words, since both know (and 
know that the other knows) that there is no question 
of real change of color. (Grice 1978: 116)
Since the tie does not really change its colour, part of 
what is meant is cancelled contextually in such cases (see 
Hirschberg 1991: 29). A second problem noticed by Grice 
refers to the use of such words as see:
If we all know that Macbeth hallucinated, we can 
quite safely say that Macbeth saw Banquo, even 
though Banquo was not there to be seen, and we 
should not conclude from this that an implication of 
the existence of the object said to be seen is not part 
of the conventional meaning of the word see, nor even 
(as some have done) that there is one sense of the word 
see which lacks this implication. (Grice 1978: 116)
The problems discussed by Grice prove that there are 
meanings which pass the cancellability test without being 
conversational implicatures.4 For this reason, the test 
provides only some evidence in favour of the presence of 
a conversational implicature which in turn forces us to 
use not only this test, but also other tests that are men-
tioned here and there in the pragmatics literature (see 
Levinson 1983: 119).
The notion of explicature
Given that the present paper deals with the question of 
whether explicatures should be considered cancellable, we 
have to elucidate the notion of explicature. In this regard, 
it makes sense to shed some light on the Gricean frame-
work which is based on the distinction between what is 
said and what is implicated. While the former is a matter 
of semantics (and merely affected by the pragmatic pro-
cesses of disambiguation and reference assignment), the 
latter is a matter of pragmatics. However, this traditional 
distinction between semantics and pragmatics has been 
questioned, because what is said turned out to depend 
much more on pragmatic processes than originally 
assumed. Among these processes are not only reference 
assignment and disambiguation but also various enrich-
ment and adjustment processes (see Clark 2013: 176). 
In the pragmatics literature, this insight is known under 
the name of the semantic underdeterminacy thesis which 
4 As we will see, explicatures, which have to be distinguished from conver-
sational implicatures, also pass the cancellability test. This is in line with 
Crimmins’ critical remarks on the cancellability test. As he points out, can-
cellability “is not a property exclusively of pragmatic implicatures” (Crim-
mins 1992: 23).
states that linguistic meaning (i.e. the semantic content 
of the sentence uttered) generally underdetermines what 
is said which is why the hearer has to resort to pragmatic 
inferencing in order to obtain the proposition directly 
communicated by an utterance (see Bach 2007: 30; Borg 
2012: 75; Carston 2002: 19; Recanati 2004: 58; Soames 
2010: 155). To illustrate, consider the following example:
(3) a. The princess is late.
 b. The princess is late for the party.
Suppose someone wants to communicate (3b) by 
uttering (3a). In this case the uttered sentence does not 
express a complete proposition which is why the hearer 
has to undertake a process of pragmatic inferencing in 
order to work out the proposition the speaker wants to 
communicate. Matters are different in the following case:
(4) a. Ramona has nothing to wear.
 b. Ramona has nothing appropriate to wear to a wed-
ding.
Here, (4a) actually expresses a complete proposition 
but not the one the speaker wants to communicate. This 
is why the hearer has to pragmatically infer (4b). Both 
examples demonstrate the semantic underdeterminacy 
of what is said and thus the need of pragmatic processes 
in order to determine the proposition directly communi-
cated by an utterance.
As one of several competing pragmatic theories, rel-
evance theory acknowledges the semantic underde-
terminacy of what is said but replaces this notion with 
the notion of explicature. An explicature is an explicitly 
communicated proposition which is a development of a 
logical form encoded by the utterance (see Sperber and 
Wilson 1986: 182). According to this definition, the main 
feature of an explicature is that it is recovered by both 
linguistic decoding and pragmatic inferencing. While the 
former pertains to the linguistic expressions used, the lat-
ter pertains to the pragmatic inferences that are involved 
in the development of the logical form encoded by the 
utterance (see Carston 2002: 117). Following this defini-
tion, we can say that utterances of (3a) and (4a) can be 
used to convey the explicatures in (3b) and (4b).
Arguments in favour of cancellable explicatures
Now, let us turn to the question of whether explicatures 
should be considered cancellable. As we have seen, explica-
tures originate from two distinct sources, the linguistic 
expressions used and the utterance context, and they are 
derived depending on these sources, by linguistic decoding 
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and by pragmatic inferencing (see ibid.). What does that 
mean for the question of cancellability? Much depends on 
how we understand pragmatic inferencing. In the pragmat-
ics literature, it is common practice to distinguish between 
two types of inferencing. On the one hand, demonstrative 
inferencing is a process whereby the premises warrant the 
conclusion which is why the conclusion cannot be cancelled 
without giving rise to contradiction; on the other hand, non-
demonstrative inferencing is a process whereby the prem-
ises do not warrant the conclusion, because they are merely 
probably true. To that effect, the conclusion can be can-
celled without giving rise to contradiction. In view of this, 
pragmatic inferencing clearly falls in the category of non-
demonstrative inferencing (see Rolf 2013: 13). Now, given 
that explicatures are recovered by means of pragmatic infer-
encing, they should be cancellable.5 In order to verify this 
assumption, let us take a look at some examples of explica-
ture cancellation, beginning with explicit cancellation:
(5) a. Some of the students passed the exam.
 b. Actually, all of them passed the exam.
When sentence (5a) is used to convey the explicature 
that some but not all of the students passed the exam, 
this explicature can be cancelled by the amendment of 
the cancellation clause in (5b) without giving rise to con-
tradiction. The same holds for the following example:
(6) a. Tom and Jane are married.
 b. But they are not married to each other.
Assuming that sentence (6a) is used to convey the expli-
cature that Tom and Jane are married to each other, this 
explicature may be cancelled by the amendment of the 
cancellation clause in (6b) without giving rise to contradic-
tion. However, sometimes the explicit cancellation of expli-
catures seems to be rather difficult. To take one example:
(7) a. I haven’t eaten breakfast.
 b. #But I have eaten breakfast today.
Suppose that someone who is asked if she is hungry 
replies (7a), thereby explicating that she has not eaten 
breakfast that day. In this case, it is difficult to cancel the 
explicature on the grounds that it would be odd to amend 
5 As Carston points out: “the pragmatically inferred elements of an explica-
ture can be explicitly cancelled without contradicting the encoded content 
of the utterance” (Carston 2010: 232).
the cancellation clause in (7b). But why is it difficult to 
cancel the explicature in question? In my opinion, this 
is due to the fact that (7a) semantically entails that the 
speaker has not eaten breakfast on the day of utterance. 
Accordingly, the attempt to cancel the explicature results 
in a contradiction.
So let us assume that there are explicatures that are 
semantically entailed. Given that such explicatures logi-
cally follow from the sentences they are based on, it is 
rather difficult to cancel them explicitly. Nevertheless, 
they can be cancelled contextually. In order to accom-
plish a contextual cancellation, it is necessary to find a 
situation in which the utterance would simply not carry 
the explicature. Suppose again someone uttering (7a), 
thereby explicating that she has not eaten breakfast that 
day. It is quite easy to imagine a situation where the utter-
ance would not carry this explicature; for example, a situ-
ation in which someone is complaining about a weekend 
she spent in a sleazy hotel. In this case, an utterance of 
(7a) would carry the explicature that the speaker has not 
eaten breakfast there.
Summing up, we have seen that explicatures are can-
cellable in that they pass the Gricean cancellability test. 
Although it is sometimes rather difficult to cancel them 
by means of explicit cancellation, it is possible to cancel 
them by means of contextual cancellation. However, sev-
eral objections to the cancellability of explicatures have 
been raised in recent years. The aim of the following 
section is to shed some light on these objections and to 
demonstrate that they are based on a misinterpretation 
of the Gricean cancellability test.
Objections to cancellable explicatures
One thing should be understood from the start: the view 
that explicatures cannot be cancelled can be traced back 
to Capone (2003, 2009, 2013, 2015) and has been taken 
up particularly by Burton-Roberts (2005, 2010, 2013). 
First and foremost, this view is based on two general 
objections to the cancellability of explicatures. The first 
objection pertains to the logical structure of discourse. 
Given that explicatures rescue fragments of discourse 
from logical absurdity, it is claimed that their cancella-
tion “would amount to returning to the problems which, 
in the first place, necessitated the explicature” (Capone 
2013: 136). In other words, explicatures cannot be can-
celled without impairing the logical structure of dis-
course. To take one example, imagine a situation in which 
someone is asked whether Karen is ready to leave for the 
airport:
(8) a. Karen is ready.
 b. #But Karen is not ready to leave for the airport.
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By uttering (8a) the speaker conveys the explicature 
that Karen is ready to leave for the airport. However, the 
same speaker cannot cancel this explicature by means of 
(8b) without impairing the logical structure of discourse 
on the grounds that the cancellation of the explicature 
would amount to the discourse fragment which necessi-
tated the explicature.6
The second objection to the cancellability of explica-
tures relies on the fact that explicatures are intended by 
the speaker and recognized as intended by the hearer. 
Since an intention implemented in an act of utterance 
cannot be unimplemented, there is no way out for the 
speaker who is committed to the proposition explicitly 
communicated by her utterance (see Burton-Roberts 
2010: 138). Consider once again (8a) where the speaker 
conveys the explicature that Karen is ready to leave for 
the airport. Given that this explicature is intended by 
the speaker and recognized as intended by the hearer, it 
cannot be cancelled without giving rise to contradic-
tion; intending to convey X and intending to convey 
not-X results in a contradiction. Either the speaker 
intends to convey X or she intends to convey not-X, but 
not both.7
As we have seen, Capone and Burton-Roberts main-
tain that we must take into account aspects such as the 
logical structure of discourse and the speaker’s commu-
nicative intentions in order to obtain the correct results 
when applying the cancellability test. However, I argue 
that placing the (explicit) cancellability test in actual dis-
course situations is a rather dubious step on the grounds 
that meanings are not cancelled by the speaker, but by 
the pragmatician who employs the cancellability test as a 
diagnostic tool. As said above, both parts of the cancel-
lability test are nothing else but thought experiments; on 
the one hand, we have to imagine a cancellation clause 
which cancels the explicature; on the other hand, we have 
to imagine an utterance context in which the utterance 
does not give rise to the explicature. To that effect, the 
objections raised by Capone and Burton-Roberts turn 
out to be unwarranted. Neither the logical structure of 
discourse nor the speaker’s intentions matter for issues of 
cancellability.
Apart from that, Capone and Burton-Roberts both 
ignore that explicatures are contextually cancellable. 
Although there are cases in which an explicature is not 
explicitly cancellable, it is contextually cancellable for 
there are always other imaginable utterance contexts 
by which the explicature at hand is cancelled. As a 
6 According to Bach, sentence (8a) does not express a complete proposition, 
but merely a propositional radical. What distinguishes a complete proposi-
tion from a propositional radical is that the latter “lacks at least one con-
stituent needed for it to be true or false” (Bach 2006: 437).
7 See also Feng (2013).
matter of fact, this view on the cancellability of expli-
catures is in accordance with the suggestions made 
by Seymour on the cancellability of conversational 
implicatures:
The fact that a particular implicature cannot be 
canceled from a particular context of use is com-
patible with its cancelability within different con-
texts of use. Particularized conversational impli-
catures may be difficult to avoid in a particular 
context of utterance, but the very same act of saying 
involved in them could have been made in quite a 
different particularized context of utterance, and 
this is all we need to argue that conversational 
implicatures are cancelable. (Seymour 2010: 2871)
All in all, we have seen that the objections to the can-
cellability of explicatures seem to be unwarranted. Since 
issues of cancellability have nothing to do with actual dis-
course situations, these objections are based on a misin-
terpretation of the Gricean cancellability test.
Conclusions
Within the Gricean framework only what is conver-
sationally implicated is cancellable, whereas what is 
conventionally implicated and what is said cannot be 
cancelled without giving rise to contradiction. In this 
paper, we have seen that explicatures, which replace 
the notion of what is said in the relevance-theoretic 
framework, are cancellable on the grounds that they are 
recovered by means of pragmatic inferencing which is 
non-demonstrative by its very nature. Apart from that, 
we have seen that the objections to the cancellability of 
explicatures seem to be unwarranted. Once we acknowl-
edge that issues of cancellability have nothing to do with 
actual discourse situations, the cancellability test turns 
out to be a coherent test and is easier to handle.
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